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I. INTRODUCTION
At the dawn of the new millennium, it is important to reflect on the
events of the 20th century. Despite its best efforts, the international
community seems no closer to stopping war and ethnic violence than at
the beginning of the century. However, through the establishment of the
International Criminal Court (hereinafter "ICC" or the "Court") there is
fresh optimism that the international community has at last found the
collective will to end impunity for those who commit the most abhorrent
crimes known to international concern. The adoption of the Rome Statute
on July 17, 1998, followed five weeks of intense negotiations between
national delegations in Rome, which in turn followed years of preparatory
work.' During both the preparatory and negotiation phases of this process,
I. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute], reprinted in
37 I.L.M. 999 (1998). The Rome Statute was adopted with a vote of 120 in favor, 7
against and 21 abstentions. On II April 2002, 10 countries ratified the Rome Statute,
surpassing the number needed to trigger entry into force of the statute on I July 2002.
On the establishment of the ICC, see generally, Essays on the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (Flavia Lattanzi & Will[i]am A. Schabas eds., 2000); The
International Criminal Court-The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations,
Results (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes
and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Roy S. Lee et al. eds., 2001); The Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to Impunity (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe
Nesi eds., 2001); William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal
Court (2001); Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court-
Observers' Notes, Article by Article (0. Triffterer ed., 1999); Reflections on the
International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Adriaan Bos (Herman A.M. von
Hebel et al. eds., 1999); Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 93 Am J. Int'l L. 22 (1999); Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the
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those involved had the benefit of an increasing body of experience from the
functioning of the existing ad hoc international criminal tribunals (the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 2 and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),3 where criminal
investigative and prosecutorial procedures were being tried and tested with
varying degrees of success.
The experiences of the ad hoc Tribunals have demonstrated that a
fundamental basis for the effective functioning of an international
criminal court is that it must be provided with sufficient independence
for the conduct of its operations and that States refrain from any acts that
would impede the performance of its functions. Although the majority
of member States to the United Nations have scrupulously respected the
principle of independence, a limited number have impeded the Tribunals'
International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections, 10 Eur. J. Int'l L. 144
(1999).
2. The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (hereinafter the "ICTY"). On the establishment of the
ICTY, see generally, Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, 1 AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1995); M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI AND PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1996); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Former Yugoslavia:
Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Establishing an
International Criminal Tribunal, in 25 SECURITY DIALOGUE 409 (1994); Theodor Meron,
War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.
78 (1994); Daphna Shraga & Ralph Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunalfor the
Former Yugoslavia, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 360 (1994); Stuart Beresford, The International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: The First Four Years, 9 OTAGO L. REV.
557 (1999); Morten Bergsmo, Note, The Establishment of the International Tribunal on
War Crimes, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 371 (1993).
3. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens responsible for
genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States,
between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 [hereinafter ICTR]. On the creation of
the ICTR, see generally, VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, I THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (1998); Jaana Karhilo, The
Establishment of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 64 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 683
(1995); Larry D. Johnson, The International Tribunal for Rwanda, 67 INT'L REV. OF
PENAL L. 211 (1996); Stuart Beresford, In Pursuit of International Justice: The First
Four-Year Term of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 8 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 99 (2000); Mariann Meier Wang, Comment, The International Tribunal for
Rwanda: Opportunities for Clarification, Opportunities for Impact, 27 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 177 (1995); Lyal S. Sunga, Note, The Commission of Experts on Rwanda
and the Creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 16 HuM. RTS. L.J.
121 (1995).
operations by restricting the movement of personnel into their territory
and placing extensive limitations on their activities.
If it is to fulfil the high expectations of those who participated in its
establishment, the ICC must be provided with the necessary privileges
and immunities so that it may function in a fair, independent and
effective manner. The ad hoc Tribunals, in this connection, are fully
integrated into the United Nations system, and therefore benefit directly
from the various legal instruments covering the privileges and
immunities of the organization. This is not the case for the Court,
where, in Rome, its independence from the United Nations was hard
won. Nonetheless, the privileges and immunities of the United Nations
and its personnel have been well established in both treaties and practice
and, hence, can serve as reference for the various practical arrangements
that are currently being prepared by the ICC Preparatory Commission.
Accordingly, to determine whether the ICC has the privileges and
immunities necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the
organization, this article will first discuss the historical development of
privileges and immunities for international organizations, including the
legal foundation of the privileges and immunities of the Court. It will
then examine the privileges and immunities of the organization as a legal
entity, before turning to the privileges and immunities accorded to the
various categories of individuals who have to attend the institution in an
official capacity. Lastly, because a number of other categories of
individuals play an essential role in the criminal process, the privileges
and immunities of counsel, witnesses, victims and the accused will be
discussed. Given the similarities in their mandates and the tasks that
they are required to perform, the degree to which the ad hoc Tribunals
have been accorded privileges and immunities, is particularly important.
The article will, therefore, examine, where appropriate, the privileges
and immunities that have been accorded to these two organizations and
their staff.
H. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES: LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Under international law, international organizations and the officials
of such organizations (as well as, diplomatic representatives of
independent States) enjoy certain privileges and immunities. In this
connection, the term 'privilege' is commonly used to refer to particular
and peculiar benefits or advantages enjoyed by an international
organization and its officials in the State where the organization is
situated (commonly referred to as the "host country"), or where its
operations are conducted that are not generally possessed by the nationals of
those States. Immunity, on the other hand, grants procedural protection
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from a penalty, burden or duty prescribed by the laws and regulations of
the State affected.
A. Historical Perspective of Privileges and Immunities
of International Criminal Courts
The emergence of international public institutions at the beginning of
the 19th century led to the establishment of international and national
norms granting the members of these institutions a limited number of
privileges and immunities previously accorded to diplomatic agents
only.4 For instance, the privileges of "independence and neutrality"
were accorded to the Central Commission for the Navigation of the
Rhine (established in accordance with the treaty concluded between
France and Germany on August 15, 1804) and European Commission on
the Danube (created under the Treaty of the Congress of Paris of 30
March 1856), while the privilege of inviolability was granted to the
members of the International Commission on Navigation in the Congo
River under the Berlin Congo Act of 1885.
At the end of the century, the Institute of International Law attempted
to codify rules and norms pertaining to diplomatic practice and activity.
In August 1895, the Institute adopted a resolution containing a
Regulation of diplomatic immunities, in which the principles of
inviolability and extraterritoriality, as well as a number of taxation
immunities, were recognized. According to the Regulation, these
privileges were to be enjoyed by public ministers of all classes and the
official personnel of diplomatic missions.5  The privileges were not
explicitly extended to the personnel of international public institutions,
presumably because few international organizations existed at the time.
However, it was understood that such persons were to be accorded a
certain level of indelVendence in order to allow them to perform their
functions effectively.
4. For a historical overview of the development of privileges and immunities of
international organizations, see Serguei Tarassenko & Ralph Zacklin, Independence of
International Civil Servants (Privileges and Immunities), in INTERNATIONAL
ADMINISTRATION 111.1 (Chris de Cooker ed., 1990); Josef L. Kunz, Privileges and
Immunities ofInternational Organizations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 828 (1947).
5. Tarassenko & Zacklin, supra note 4 at 111.1/2-1/3 (observing that the non-
official staff of a diplomatic mission, if not citizens of the receiving state, were also
deemed to enjoy the privilege of inviolability on the premises of the mission).
6. Id. at III.1/3.
With the increase in international public institutions after the First
World War, there grew an awareness of the need to ensure that the
personnel of such organizations, in the performance of their functions,
were entirely independent of, and protected from, pressure from the
authorities of individual States, and were empowered "to deal with the
agents of national governments on a footing of equality. ''7  As an
example, Article 7, paragraph 4 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations provided that the representatives of the Members and officials of
the League "when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy
diplomatic privileges and immunities."8
By the time the United Nations was established in 1945, the
recognition of privileges and immunities accorded to international
organizations and their personnel had evolved into a rule of customary
law. This principle was enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations
7. MARTIN HILL, IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF INTERNATIONAL OFFICIALS: THE
EXPERIENCE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 4 (1947).
8. "The Covenant of the League did not specify the diplomatic privileges and
immunities to be enjoyed by its officials... The detail[s of such] arrangement[s]... were
worked out in an agreement, entitled the Provisional 'Modus Vivendi,' concluded
between the Secretary-General of the League and the Swiss Government in 1921.
According to the Provisional 'Modus Vivendi,' the League['s personnel] were divided
into two categories.
[T]he first category comprised all members of the higher administrative and research
staff. [Such persons] were entitled.. .to the same diplomatic privileges and immunities
as enjoyed by members of diplomatic missions accredited to the Swiss Confederation,
[including, inter alia,] inviolability; extra-territoriality; immunity from civil and criminal
jurisdiction; general exemption from direct personal taxes and taxes on property;
privileges regarding customs...; entitlement to diplomatic visas; exemption from the
obligation of reporting in person to the police authorities ... and submitting their identity
papers. Family members of an official [within] this category were, as a general rule,
granted the same status as the head of a family, provided that they permanently resided
with [the official concerned].
[T]he second category [encompassed] lower administrative staff as well as clerical and
stenographic staff. [Although] they were entitled to complete immunity [regarding any]
acts performed [by them] in their official capacity and within the limits of their duties,
[t]hey were... subject to local laws and jurisdiction [regarding any] acts performed by
them in their private, unofficial capacity. Like officials of the first category, officials of
this category were exempt from the obligation of reporting... to the police and
submitting identity papers. In addition, [they] were exempt from taxes on salary and
capital (if the amount of the income did not exceed that of the salary) .... The family
members [of persons falling in this category] were granted a status equivalent to that of
the head of the family.
Provisions applicable to [staff falling within these two categories] did not apply,
[however], to staff members of Swiss nationality. [Such persons were only accorded]
immunity from jurisdiction in respect of all acts performed by them in their official
capacity and within the limits of their duties... [and were granted] exemption from the
payment of the 'tax sur le revenue professionnel' on the salaries paid to them by the
League of Nations." Tarassenko & Zacklin, supra note 4, at 1II. 1/4-5. A text of the
Covenant of the League of Nations is available in Robert Jones & S. S. Sherman, THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS FROM IDEA TO REALITY 191-205 (1927).
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(UN Charter), which provides that the Secretary-General and the
officials of the organization shall "enjoy such privileges and immunities
as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in
connection with the Organization." 9 To determine the scope of such
privileges and immunities, the UN Charter provides that the General
Assembly 'may propose conventions' to Member States for this
purpose.
I
These provisions were carefully studied by the UN Preparatory
Commission which fully endorsed-in light of the inherent conflict
between international privileges and immunities and the legitimate
interests of host countries, together with practical considerations - the
concept of functional necessity of privileges and immunities.11 Bearing
this in mind, the General Assembly adopted the General Convention on
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations on February 13,
1946, that contains a number of provisions governing important aspects
of the organization's operations which apply to these privileges and
immunities; including such matters as the institution's property, assets,
communications and various tax exemptions.
12
These instruments are augmented by a wide array of other agreements
regulating the activities of the United Nations. Privileges and
9. U.N. CHARTER art. 105, 2.
10. Id. art. 105, 13.
11. The limitation of the organization's privileges and immunities to only those
which are necessary for the independent exercise of its functions, differs from the
privileges and immunities accorded to states, who possess the totality of international
rights and duties. As Brouwer observes "compared to states, international
organizations... have a more limited capacity to engage in the tit-for-tat self-help
measures that are vital to the enforcement of legal rights in international relations. At the
same time, international organizations necessarily perform tasks that states cannot
accomplish by themselves. Thus, international organizations have to do "more" with
"less," while at the same time overcoming collective-action problems." Charles H.
Brouwer II, International Immunities, Some Dissident Views on the Role of Municipal
Courts, 41 VA. J. INT'LL. 1, 16-17 (2000).
12. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, U.N. Doc.
A/DEC/49/475, 1 U.N.T.S. 15 (1946) [hereinafter General Convention]. Close to 140
member States have now acceded to the General Convention, among them major host
nations (Austria (1956) and USA (1970)). Switzerland is not a party to the General
Convention. Nonetheless, the U.N. Office at Geneva enjoys almost identical privileges
and immunities under individual seat agreements concluded in 1946. In any case, as
Gerster observes, "since Article 105 of the UN Charter is self-executing, even members
who have not acceded to the [General Convention] are - given the universal acceptance
of the Convention-bound to provide for identical privileges and immunities." M.
Gerster, Article 105, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1138
(Bruno Simma ed., 1994).
immunities are included in the agreements with governments concerning
the headquarters of the central and regional offices of the United
Nations, and in the status agreements governing the conditions under
which the various United Nations operated institutions-such as,
information centers, research and science institutions-to carry out their
functions. To ensure that the participants in conferences and other
meetings held under the auspices of the United Nations are accorded
those privileges and immunities necessary for the independent exercise
of their functions, similar provisions are included in the relevant host
agreements with the governments involved. 13
In his report on the establishment of the ICTY,'4 the UN Secretary-
General stated that, since it was created as a subsidiary body of the Security
Council, "the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations of 13 February 1946 would apply to the International Tribunal, the
judges, the Prosecutor and his staff, and the Registrar and his staff."' 15 As
to the scope of their privileges and immunities, the Secretary General
recommended that:
The judges, the Prosecutor and the Registrar would be granted the privileges
and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys, in
accordance with international law. The staff of the Prosecutor and the Registrar
would enjoy the privileges and immunities of officials of the United Nations
within the meaning of articles V and VII of the Convention.16
He further proposed that other persons, including the accused, required
at the seat of the ICTY, be accorded such treatment as necessary for the
proper functioning of the organization.' 7 These recommendations were
endorsed by the Security Council and were included almost verbatim in
Article 30 of the ICTY Statute.18
On May 27, 1994, an agreement was signed between the United
Nations and the government of the Kingdom of The Netherlands
formalizing the presence of the ICTY in The Hague.' 9 Although the
13. Tarassenko & Zacklin, supra note 4, at 111.1/6-1/7.
14. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808, U.N. Doc S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993).
15. Id. 7 128.
16. Id.
17. Id. [ 129.
18. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, annexed to Sec. C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (1993).
19. Agreement between the United Nations and the Kingdom of the Netherlands
concerning the Headquarters of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/1994/848, (May 27, 1994)
[hereinafter ICTY Headquarters Agreement].
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headquarters agreement is concerned primarily with normal incidents of
diplomatic or international relationships to reflect the specific requirements
of the tribunal, a number of provisions are also included relating
specifically to the movements of the accused, defense counsel and
witnesses in The Netherlands.20
These privileges and immunities were reaffirmed in agreements
concluded between the United Nations and the governments of Bosnia,
Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia relating
to the presence of ICTY field offices in Sarajevo, 21 Belgrade22 and
Zagreb3. These offices were established to provide support to the
investigation teams of the Office of the Prosecutor in order to perform
liaison functions with local and national governments and organizations
in the area, and to provide expert legal advice on republic and federal
law in the former Yugoslavia.2 4 As such, the agreements not only
contain the standard privileges and immunities applicable to the United
Nations and its personnel, but also include provisions relating
specifically to the Tribunal's investigations. Such provisions include the
right to access all documentary material relevant for the effective
operation of the liaison office; to have direct contact with central and
local authorities and government agencies; to question victims and
witnesses; to collect evidence and useful information, as well as to
conduct on-site investigations; to gain access to all prisons, detention
centers and places of interrogation; and to speak in private to any person
held therein.
20. Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the former Yugoslavia since 1991, 169, U.N. Doc. A/49/342 (August 29, 1994).
21. Exchange of Letters between the United Nations and the Government of the
Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Status of the Liaison Office of the Prosecutor of the
International Tribunal (Jan. 30 & Feb. 16, 1996) [hereinafter Sarajevo Office
Agreement] (on file with author).
22. Exchange of Letters between the United Nations and the Government of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Status of the Liaison Office of the Prosecutor of
the International Tribunal (Aug. 8 & 12, 1996) [hereinafter Belgrade Office Agreement]
(on file with author).
23. Exchange of Letters between the United Nations and the Government of the
Republic of Croatia on the Status of the Liaison Office of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Dec. 6, 1999 & Feb. 10, 2000) [hereinafter Zagreb
Office Agreement] (on file with author).
24. Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the former Yugoslavia since 1991, 37, U.N. Doc. A/50/365-S/1995/728 (August 2,
1995).
The privileges and immunities of the judges, the Prosecutor, the
Registrar and the officials of the ICTR are defined in Article 29 of the
ICTR Statute in exactly the same terms as its ICTY equivalent.25 With
respect to the headquarters of the ICTR, the town of Arusha, located in
northern Tanzania, was selected as the seat of the Tribunal and an
agreement articulating the privileges and immunities that would be
accorded to the organization was subsequently concluded.26 In January
1995, the ICTR opened an Investigative and Prosecutorial Unit in Kigali,
Rwanda, 27 and - following protracted and often difficult negotiations -
an agreement covering the privileges and immunities of this office and
its personnel was concluded in June 1999.28
B. The Legal Basis for the Privileges and Immunities of the ICC
As a treaty-based international organization, the ICC and its officials
will require sufficient diplomatic status to carry out their responsibilities.
However, unlike the ad hoc Tribunals, the ICC is not an organ of the
United Nations and, consequently, the Court and its officials do not fall
under the umbrella of the General Convention. The Rome Statute
addresses this situation by guaranteeing to the organization "in the
territory of each State Party such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes., 29 With respect to persons
required to attend the institution in an official capacity-who need the
protection of privileges and immunities to perform their work
independently-Article 48, paragraphs 2 and 3 states:
The judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors and the Registrar shall,
when engaged on or with respect to the business of the Court, enjoy the same
privileges and immunities as are accorded to heads of diplomatic missions and
shall, after the expiry of their terms of office, continue to be accorded immunity
from legal process of every kind in respect of words spoken or written and acts
performed by them in their official capacity.
The Deputy Registrar, the staff of the Office of the Prosecutor and the staff
of the Registry shall enjoy the privileges and immunities and facilities necessary
for the performance of their functions, in accordance with the agreement on the
25. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, annexed to Sec. C.
Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1602 (1994).
26. Agreement between the United Nations and the United Republic of Tanzania
concerning the Headquarters of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda of 31
August 1995 (Appendix), U.N. Doc A/51/399-S/1996/778 [hereinafter ICTR
Headquarters Agreement].
27. Karhilo, supra note 3, at 711.
28. Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the Republic
of Rwanda to Regulate Matters of Mutual Concern Relating to the Office in Rwanda of
the International Tribunal for Rwanda (June 3, 1999) [hereinafter Kigali Office
Agreement] (on file with author).
29. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 48, 1.
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privileges and immunities of the Court.
30
In addition to the senior officials of the Court and its staff, Article 48
provides that other persons who will have business with, or appear
before the organization, either as counsel, experts, witnesses or in some
other capacity, will be accorded the privileges, immunities and facilities
necessary for the performance of their functions.
31
Although the Rome Statute specifies that the ICC and its representatives
shall enjoy the requisite privileges and immunities necessary to function,
Article 48 simply contains general statements of the Court's privileges
and immunities; the details are not spelled out in the Statute. While
there is no specific reference in the Rome Statute for such an agreement,
the ICC Preparatory Commission set out, at its sixth session held in New
York between November 27 and December 8, 2000, to draft an
agreement on privileges and immunities for the Court.32 Even though it
will not be opened for signature until the first meeting of the Assembly
of State Parties, at the earliest, the draft Agreement on the Privileges and
Immunities of the International Criminal Court confers, in fairly broad
terms, sufficient legal protection upon the organization and its
representatives for all activities undertaken in their official capacity;
particularly focusing on the unique needs of the prosecution to conduct
its investigations.
30. Id. 2 & 3.
31. Article 48, paragraph 5 also provides that the privileges and immunities of a
judge or the Prosecutor may be waived by an absolute majority of the judges; those of
the Registrar may be waived by the Presidency; those of the Deputy Prosecutors and
staff of the Office of the Prosecutor may be waived by the Prosecutor; those of the
Deputy Registrar and staff of the Registry may be waived by the Registrar.
32. See Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee at its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/L.4/Rev.1 (2000) (summarizing the proceedings of the sixth session of
the Preparatory Commission), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/
prepfra.htmI. See also Lindsay Zelniker, Note, Towards a Functional International
Criminal Court: An Argument in Favor of a Strong Privileges and Immunities
Agreement, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 988, 1006 (2001).
33. Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee at its seventh session; Draft
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Court, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2001/L.I/Add. 3 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Agreement], available at http://
www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomnsep2001/english/pcnicc_2001_add3e.doc. As the ICTR
Registrar, Adema Dieng observed "this document will prove to be a great asset to the
future ICC." As the experience of the ad hoc Tribunals has demonstrated "[n]egotiating
host countries agreements in various countries where the Court will need to operate can
be a lengthy process, putting at risk evidence, staff and assets in the interim. This
document will provide a pre-negotiated agreement." Address by the Registrar of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Adama Dieng to the Preparatory
The multi-faceted structure to the privileges and immunities of the
ICC is further illustrated by reference in Article 3 of the Rome Statute to
a headquarters agreement, which will address the specific needs of the
Court in the host country. This bilateral agreement-which should be
goal-oriented, supporting the fulfillment of the independence and
efficiency of the institution and should facilitate the smooth and efficient
functioning of the Court, as well as support its long-term stability-will
be concluded between the President and the government of The
Netherlands once the organization has been established.34 In the
meantime, the Preparatory Commission has been given the responsibility
of formulating general principles that shall govern the negotiation of
such an agreement.
35
I. STATUS, FUNCTIONING AND PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
OF THE ORGANIZATION
The subject matter of those sections of the draft Agreement that relate
to the organization itself can essentially be divided into four groups.
While the first two concern the articles on the legal status of the
institution and its premises, respectively, the third relates to those
provisions governing the privileges and immunities of the organization.
The fourth group contains some miscellaneous provisions that,
nonetheless, play a crucial role in the relationship that the organization
shares with its host country.
36
A. Legal Personality of the Organizations
An examination of the legal standing of the ICC requires an
exploration of its legal personality on both the national and international
level. In this connection, the first preliminary matter that needs to be
addressed is whether the organization has the capacity to conclude
Commission for the International Criminal Court during its Eighth Session, October 1,
2001 [hereinafter Address ICTR Registrar], available at http://www.iccnow.
org/html/ICTR.html (last visited May 1, 2002).
34. See Hans Corell, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court
and the Host Country, in REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ADRIAAN BOs 181-88 (Herman A.M. von Hebel et al. eds., 1999)
(describing the core elements that should be contained in the ICC Headquarters
Agreement).
35. Basic principles governing an agreement to be negotiated between the
International Criminal Court and the Kingdom of the Netherlands regarding the
headquarters of the Court, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2001/WGHQA/L.1 (2001) [hereinafter
Basic Principles], available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/sep2001/english/
wghqalle.doc (last visited May 1, 2002).
36. Such provisions include articles on settlements of disputes, denunciation,
amendment and date of entry into force. See Draft Agreement, supra note 33, arts. 31 &
34-36.
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agreements with States and make claims in respect of the rights
contained therein. The second issue of fundamental concern is whether
it is able to conclude contracts, institute legal proceedings, and acquire
and dispose of property under the national law of the States concerned.
Although provisions recognizing their national legal personality have
been included explicitly, the headquarters agreements of the ad hoc
Tribunals do not refer to the other and more crucial form of legal
personality.37 Reference to international juridical personality is also
absent from the General Convention. 38 Nevertheless, in its Advisory
Opinion on the Reparation for Injuries suffered in the Service of the
United Nations, the International Court of Justice (hereinafter the "ICJ")
ruled that the United Nations possessed "a large measure of international
personality. 39 Confronted with the question of whether the institution
had the capacity to bring an international claim against a state, the ICJ
concluded that the possession of juridical personality on the international
plane is dictated by the functions and purposes of the organization, as
laid down in its constituent instruments, rather than by a strict legal
formulation bestowing international legal personality.4 ° In the words of
the ICJ:
[T]he organization was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising
and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of
the possession of large measure of international personality and the capacity to
operate upon an international plane. It is at present the supreme type of
international organization, and it could not carry out the intentions of its
founders if it was devoid of international personality. It must be acknowledged
that its members, by entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant duties
and responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence required to enable
those functions to be effectively discharged.
4 1
By analogy, the reasoning of the ICJ can be applied to other
international organizations.42 Accordingly, as they have been given the
37. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. 111(1); ICTR Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 26, art. 111(1).
38. See General Convention, supra note 12, art. I, § 1.
39. Reparations for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (1949) [hereinafter Reparations for injuries]. See also
Quincy Wright, The Jural Personality of the United Nations, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 509
(1949).
40. A. S. MULLER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR HOST STATES:
ASPECTS OF THEIR LEGAL RELATIONSHIP 77 (1995).
41. Reparations for injuries, supra note 39, at 179.
42. HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL
LAW 979 (1995) (asking "if organizations are empowered to conclude treaties to
responsibility of prosecuting the perpetrators of some of the most
egregious crimes known to humankind-a function that will require
them to issue arrest warrants and other binding orders to member States,
as well as conclude treaties regarding the enforcement of their sentences
-the ad hoc Tribunals can be said to have both the capacity to act and
the capacity to operate in the international community with their own
personality, distinct from the member States from which they were
established.
The ICC, on the other hand, is not faced with the problem of having to
assert its international legal personality by inference. Unlike the ad hoc
Tribunals, the Court-in recognition of the fact that it is a recognizable
legal entity, distinct from the State Parties-will be explicitly provided
legal personality on the international level as well as within the legal
order of the host country. Article 2 of the draft Agreement reads:
The Court shall have international legal personality and shall also have such
legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the
fulfillment of its purposes. It shall, in particular, have the capacity to contract,
to acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property and to participate in
legal proceedings
3
This provision will ensure that the Court has sufficient legal standing
for the independent exercise of its functions. The author is surprised,
nonetheless, that the drafters of this provision decided to limit the right
to mere participation in legal proceedings and not institution thereof, a
right that is included within the juridical personality of the ad hoc
Tribunals (and the United Nations, in general). 44  Although the
organization may rely' on arbitration procedures for the settlement of
contractual disputes, it should be vested with the authority to take
recourse to national courts to claim damages and/or compensation
arising out of the loss of or damage to its property or assets.
B. The Premises of the Organizations
Before embarking on a detailed analysis of the privileges and
immunities of the ICC, it is first necessary to examine the position of the
exchange diplomats, and to mobilize international forces .... how can such powers be
exercised without having the status of international legal person?").
43. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 2. See also PHILLIPE SANDS & PIERRE
KLEIN, BOWETT's LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 471 (2001) (concluding that the
explicit attribution of international legal personality to the Court reflects the change in
international society, which is increasingly open to the co-existence of various categories
of subjects of international law).
44. See General Convention, supra note 12, art. 1, § I at T (c). This segment of the
General Convention provides that the United Nations shall have the capacity "to institute
legal proceedings."
45. See Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 30.
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actual premises of the Court within the legal order of its host country,
especially as they are the most visible aspect of the organization and the
location where most of its activities will occur. Since it is customary for
provisions on the actual seat of an international organization to be
contained within the bilateral instruments of the host arrangements, the
ICC Preparatory Commission has proposed that the ICC Headquarters
Agreement contain provisions on law and authority on the premises of
the Court providing, in particular:
[T]he premises of the Court shall be under the control and authority of the
Court; the Court shall have the power to make regulations operative within the
premises and may expel or exclude persons from the premises for violation of
its regulations; except as otherwise provided in the headquarters agreement, the
laws and regulations of the host country shall apply on the premises of the
Court.
4 6
However, in light of the brevity of this provision, to fully appreciate
the legal status of the Court in the territory of The Netherlands and to
identify the laws and regulations that will apply within its seat, reference
should be made to the experiences of the ad hoc Tribunals in this regard.
Under their respective headquarters agreements, the ICTY and ICTR
premises are defined as "buildings, parts of buildings and areas,
including installations and facilities made available to, maintained,
occupied or used by the Tribunal in the host country in connection
within its functions and purposes. 47  The governments of the
Netherlands and Tanzania thus recognize that the premises of the ICTY
and ICTR, respectively, shall be under the control and authority of the
organizations concerned.48  However, the laws and regulations of the
host countries still apply within the seat of the organizations unless
specified otherwise in the General Convention or the relevant
headquarters agreement.49 In this connection, most of the specifications
46. Basic Principles, supra note 35, 8. See also CORELL, supra note 34, at 185
(observing that such "regulations should, within [the ICC] premises or headquarters
district, be operative even though they may be inconsistent with the laws and regulations
of the host country. For example, in the area of labor law, the retirement age that might
be specified in the [staff regulations of the ICC] may differ from the laws of the host
country."). Id.
47. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. I(b); ICTR Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 26, art. I(b).
48. See ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. VI(I); ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. VI(l).
49. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. VI(2); ICTR Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 26, art. VI(2).
concerning the non-application of national law-such as exemption from
the immigration regime applicable in the host countries-are designed to
side-step national mechanisms for the supervision and enforcement of
the law; the main rationale being to secure the independent position of
the two organizations. They are not, in general, intended to push aside
the laws themselves.5°
One further exception to the rule relating to the applicability of
national law is the ability of the ad hoc Tribunals to adopt regulations
operative within their premises which are designed to supercede laws
and regulations of the host countries that may affect the independence of
the their operations. 5' However, in keeping with the general reluctance
of international organizations to adopt regulations overriding national
legislation, neither institution has done so.
The independence of the ad hoc Tribunals is not solely dependent on
the privileges and immunities that shield the two organizations from the
exercise of domestic jurisdiction by judicial and administrative
authorities. The continuous supply, on equitable terms, of public
services and other amenities is equally important for the effective
functioning of the organization. For this reason, the headquarters
agreements of the ad hoc Tribunals provide:
The competent authorities [of the host country] shall secure, on fair conditions
and upon the request of the Registrar or on his behalf, the public services
needed by the Tribunal such as, but not limited to, postal, telephone and
telegraphic services, electricity, water, gas, sewage, collection of waste, fire
protection, local transportation and cleaning of public streets.
53
It would be nafve to expect that the public services supplied to the ad
hoc Tribunals will never be interrupted. In such situations, the host
countries are under a due diligence obligation to restore the supply as
50. MULLER, supra note 40, at 134.
51. See ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. VI(3); ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. VI(3). It should be noted that "[a]ny
dispute between the Tribunal and the host country, as to whether a regulation of the
Tribunal is authorized by this Article, or as to whether a law or regulation of the host
country is inconsistent with any regulation of the Tribunal authorized by this Article,
shall be promptly settled by the procedure set out in Article XXVIII, paragraph 2 of the
[ICTY Headquarters Agreement]. Pending such settlement, the regulation of the
Tribunal shall apply and the law or regulations of the host country shall be inapplicable
on the premises of the Tribunal to the extent that the Tribunal claims it to be inconsistent
with its regulations." ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. VI(4).
52. See MULLER, supra note 40, at 136 (observing that at its headquarters in New
York, the United Nations has only adopted four such regulations); see also Paul C.
Szasz, Current Development: The United Nations Legislates to Limit its Liability, 81
AM. J. INT'L L. 739 (1987).
53. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XII(l); ICTR Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 26, art. XII (1).
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soon as possible and to minimize the damage to the organizations.54
Moreover, the two organizations are to be accorded, with respect to
public services, a similar status to the essential agencies and organs of
the government in question that are granted priority in times of
shortage.55
Having determined the position of the ICC premises within the
territory of The Netherlands, a few words need to be said about the
presence of the ICC facilities outside the host country. In view of the
fact that it is a criminal court with potentially unlimited territorial
jurisdiction, the Court may choose to establish regional and national
offices throughout the globe in order to facilitate the conduct of its
operations, as well as to conduct research, store archives, and other
materials in secure locations and communicate with national officials.
Moreover, to reduce costs, as well as to strengthen reconciliation, and to
increase the awareness of its activities within those regions where crimes
were committed, the Court may decide to sit and conduct trials outside
The Hague. It is, therefore, unfortunate that the draft Agreement did not
reiterate the notion that the relevant privileges and immunities of the
organization-such as inviolability of the premises-apply to all offices
used or occupied by the institution, even if they are only occupied
temporarily and irrespective of ownership.
A further area of concern relates to the absence of language obliging
States Parties to take all the effective and adequate measures necessary
to ensure the security, safety and protection of the ICC, its property,
premises and the immediate vicinity thereof. A provision to this effect
has been included within the draft principles of the ICC Headquarters
Agreement.56 While this would safeguard the Court's operations in The
Netherlands, the experiences of the ad hoc Tribunals have demonstrated
the need to establish bases in the field from which the prosecution may
carry out its investigative operations. In such cases, it would have been
highly advantageous to place the States Parties on notice that they are
under a positive obligation to secure, safeguard and protect the premises
of the organization in such circumstances.
54. MULLER, supra note 40, at 143.
55. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XII(3); ICTR Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 26, art. XII(3).
56. Basic Principles, supra note 35, 9.
C. Inviolability of Premises, Assets and Archives
Regarding the privileges and immunities of the ICC, it should be
noted that, while the Court has been accorded a special position within
the legal order of States Parties, its enjoyment of this status is limited to
those matters necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.57
Nevertheless, in order to have the independence necessary for the
effective performance of its functions, the organization has first been
granted protection against control and interference by the governments
of the host country. Second, the host country is prohibited from deriving
financial advantages by levying fiscal charges on its funds. Lastly, the
institution, as a collective of the States Parties, has been granted the
same facilities for the conduct of its official business as the host country
customarily extends to other States.
The inviolability of the ICC (as in all host country arrangements) is a
multi-tiered privilege, which can be divided into several elements.58
First of all, a distinction can be drawn between the inviolability of the
premises, funds and assets of the Court,59 and the inviolability of its
archives (namely, the records, correspondence, documents, manuscripts,
photographs, files and sound recordings).6 ° Such a difference arises as
the need to protect the inviolability of the archives goes beyond the
physical realm of the headquarters. 6' For instance, sensitive
documentary evidence collected in the field may be carried in a briefcase
by an ICC investigator traveling from an investigation site to The Hague.
The inviolability accorded to the investigator-as well as any official
motor vehicle in which he is travelling-would be thwarted if the
documents themselves were not similarly protected. Reference to a
locality limitation is therefore omitted in Article 7 of the draft
Agreement, which provides that "[t]he archives of the Court, and all
papers and documents in whatever form, and materials being sent to or
from the Court, held by the Court or belonging to it, wherever located
and by whomever held, shall be inviolable."
57. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 3; see also ICTY Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 19, art. II; ICTR Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. II.
58. See MULLER, supra note 40, at 186.
59. See id.; Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 6. For the inviolability of the
property, funds and assets of the ad hoc Tribunals. See General Convention, supra note
12, art. II, § 3; ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. V; ICTR Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 26, art. V.
60. See MULLER, supra note 40, at 186; Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 7.
For the inviolability of the archives and documents of the ad hoc Tribunals, see General
Convention, supra note 12, art. II, § 4; ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19,
art. IX; ICTR Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. IX.
61. See MULLER, supra note 40, at 204.
62. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 7.
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Within this privilege, a second distinction can be made between the
various obligations that are placed on the host country. Officials of The
Netherlands will be under a 'passive' obligation not to enter, in the
widest possible meaning of the word, the ICC premises or search,
confiscate or otherwise interfere with the assets of the organization
without the express consent of the competent authorities of the Court.63
Furthermore, judicial actions and the service or execution of legal
process, including the seizure of private property, cannot be enforced on
the premises of the institution. 64 However, in order to prevent the loss of
life and limit the damage to property in case of a fire or other crisis
requiring prompt protective action, the organization is under a duty to
co-operate in good faith with the competent authorities.65 In this
context, on account of the urgency associated with such emergency
situations, the consent of the Court shall always be presumed.66
By referring to the headquarters agreement of the ad hoc Tribunals,
the author notes that the inviolability of the ICC will impose an active
duty on the host country to secure and protect the premises and their
vicinity, and to guarantee that "the [tranquillity] of the [Court] is not
disturbed by the intrusion of persons or groups of persons from outside
the premises of the [Court] or by disturbances in their immediate
vicinity." 67 The host country must also provide, at the request of the
competent authorities of the Court, an adequate number of police "for
the preservation of law and order on the premises of the [Court] or in the
immediate vicinity thereof, and for the removal of persons therefrom.,
68
In terms of its contents, the inviolability of the premises, assets and
archives of the ICC will not differ much from the inviolability of other
international organizations, including the ad hoc Tribunals.
Nonetheless, three points need to be mentioned. First, the question of
legal ownership is not relevant for the determination of whether the
premises, assets or archives of the Court are inviolable; the use of
63. Basic Principles, supra note 35, T 7.
64. Id.
65. MULLER, supra note 40, at 191 (arguing that the notion of good faith and
cooperation is at the very essence of the relations between a host state and an
international organization).
66. Basic Principles, supra note 35, 7.
67. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. VII(l); ICTR Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 26, art. VII(I).
68. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. VII(2); ICTR Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 26, art. VII(2).
premises for official purposes is the essential criterion.69 Second, it is
probable that the Court-like both the ICTY and the ICTR-will at
some stage and especially during its start-up phase share buildings with
other international organizations or commercial companies. In
accordance with the notion of functional necessity, only those parts
exclusively used by the organization may be declared inviolable.7°
Finally, since a building used by the organization retains its inviolability,
even though it is not permanently occupied, the Court is under a duty to
notify the State Party of the exact location of its premises and to keep it
informed of its intended use.]
The premises of the ICC and its property, funds and assets are not
only shielded from physical intrusions by the national authorities but
also from less noticeable interference through legal and quasi-legal
methods. The draft Agreement emphasizes this by prescribing that "[t]he
property, funds and assets of the Court, wherever located and by
whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, seizure, requisition,
confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether
by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action. 72 While this
should not cause too many concerns, in order to operate effectively, the
Court will need to be able to transfer evidence between the crime scene
and the seat of the organization. It is foreseeable that the transfer of such
evidence may, on occasion, violate international law, for instance, when
the court must transfer of narcotics or prohibited weaponry. To avoid
potential difficulties, the definition of assets in the draft Agreement
should be expanded to include "evidence and other material gathered
during the course of investigations."
As only the premises (or parts thereof), grounds and motor vehicles
used exclusively by an international organization are inviolable, the ICC
will be under an additional obligation to notify the authorities of the
States Parties concerned as to what these premises, grounds and vehicles
consist of. To facilitate such identification, the Court is permitted to
"display its flag, emblem and markings at its premises" as well as on any
vehicle used for official purposes.73 With respect to the documents and
69. Gerster, supra note 12, at 1140-41.
70. See MULLER, supra note 40, at 188.
71. For instance, even though the officials of the ICTY Liaison Office in Belgrade
were evacuated prior to the start of the NATO bombing in April 1999, the Serbian
authorities respected the inviolability of the premises even though it was left vacant.
72. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 6(2). The equivalent privilege accorded
to the ad hoc Tribunals is found in ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art.
V(I); ICTR Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. V(1). See also General
Convention, supra note 12, art. 1I, § 3.
73. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 5. The equivalent privilege accorded to
the ad hoc Tribunals is found in ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XIII
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other forms of archives, the organization must also ensure that,
whenever possible, they bear some kind of official identification mark so
that the competent authorities have some way of knowing to which
object(s) the relevant immunity applies.74
D. Immunity from Legal Process
Immunity from legal process, which is designed to secure an
independent and tranquil working environment, is one of the most
important immunities granted to international organizations. For
instance, the jurisdictional immunity of the ad hoc Tribunals derives
from Article I, Section 2 of the General Convention and is replicated in
full in the two headquarters agreements, which states:
The Tribunal, its funds, assets and other property, wherever located and by
whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process,
except insofar as in any particular case the Tribunal has expressly waived its
immunity. It is understood, however, that no waiver of immunity shall extend
to any measure of execution.
75
Adopting virtually identical language, the draft Agreement safeguards
the ICC, as well as its property, funds and assets against the jurisdiction
of the courts of the States Parties.76 Such immunity is necessary, as the
work of the Court would be severely hampered if nationals of the States
Parties could freely institute legal proceedings against it, allowing
national courts to make pronouncements over its policy decisions. Even
so, there is an inherent conflict between the institution's need for
independence within the legal order of the States Parties and the latter's
need for adequate means of redress for their inhabitants. Accordingly,
like the jurisdictional immunities enjoyed by persons working for the
organization, the immunity from suit of the organization is based on the
notion of functional necessity.77
The decision as to whether or not it is immune from legal process is
for the ICC to decide and no one else. As Muller states, "[i]f this were
not the case, the organization would risk being exposed to discretionary
measures by the host state. However, after having determined that it is
and ICTR Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. XIII.
74. See MULLER, supra note 40, at 204-05.
75. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. VIII(l); ICTR Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 26, art. VIII(l).
76. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 6(1).
77. See MULLER, supra note 40, at 151.
indeed immune, the organization can choose to waive this immunity,
thus lifting the shield that protects it from national jurisdiction. 78 In all
cases, the waiver must be explicit, must relate to the particular matter in
issue, and must be in writing.
There is a growing consensus among international organizations that,
because it is based on the concept of functional necessity, jurisdictional
immunity cannot be invoked to deflect civil actions brought by a third
party for damages arising from an accident caused by a motor vehicle
owned or operated by an international organization. 79 Any functional
necessity argument in support of immunity for the ICC is undermined by
the reality that such incidents will generally be covered by motor vehicle
insurance. Accordingly, in the author's opinion, the draft Agreement
should be amended to exclude auto accident liability from the
organization's jurisdictional immunity.
In connection with the concept of 'waiver of immunity,' the author
notes that for most international organizations, including the ad hoc
Tribunals, the chief executive of the organization or his duly appointed
representative will effectuate the actual waiver. However, given the
construction of the constituent organs of the ICC, it may not be
appropriate for the Registrar to waive the court's immunity, particularly
with respect to a matter involving the Office of the Prosecutor or the
Presidency. It is, therefore, suggested that appropriate language should
be included, specifying which official will be responsible for taking such
a decision.
Having determined the process by which waiver is effected, the next
question that needs to be addressed is the scope of the actual waiver;
namely, does it extend to both legal process and measures of execution
or only the former? Under the General Convention, immunity from
execution cannot be the subject of waiver.8° Such exclusion is premised
on the basis of functional necessity, especially as seizure by national
courts of the property of the United Nations may cause irreparable harm
to the effective functioning of the organization in a particular situation.
During their preliminary discussions on this matter, a number of
delegates attending the Preparatory Committee expressed a preference
for the inclusion of language specifying that the ICC may waive its
immunity with respect to a measure of execution. 81 The inclusion of this
78. Id. at 162-63.
79. Id. at 161.
80. See General Convention, supra note 12, art. II, § 2.
81. See Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee at its Sixth Session, Annex IV,
Draft Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Court: Discussion paper
proposed by the Coordinator, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/L.4/Rev.I/Add.3 (2000), at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomn/nov2000/english/rev I ad3e.doc (last visited May 1,2002).
[VOL. 3: 83, 2002] Privileges and Immunities
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
language-which is not as strong as the equivalent provisions of the
headquarters agreements of the ad hoc Tribunals-would have had a
negative consequence for the operations of the organization. For
instance, although it is under an obligation to act in good faith, an
unscrupulous State Party may use this provision to exert undue influence
on the Court to enable a supplier of goods and services to the
organization-especially one that is government owned or otherwise
endorsed-to seize the property of the Court to cover an unpaid debt.
Fortunately, the views of those advocating a more cautious approach
prevailed and the delegates agreed that "no waiver of immunity shall
extend to any measure of execution.
' 82
The fact that the ICC is shielded from the domestic jurisdiction of the
courts of the States Parties should not mean, however, that vendors have
no means of redress to enforce their rights.83 One of the fundamental
cornerstones of the future relationship between the Court and the States
Parties will be the obligation to co-operate in good faith. The Court, as
an international organization that deals with private parties, should not
use its jurisdictional immunity to hide from its responsibilities. 84 It is
under an obligation to create alternative and adequate means of redress,
in case disputes with third parties arise.
85
Even so, obligating the ICC to establish a dispute resolution
mechanism is not the same as actually getting settlement. Nothing in the
draft Agreement requires the Court to act in a timely manner. However,
the drafters must recognize that any delay, whether purposeful or
accidental, may cause irreparable harm, for instance, to a small local
firm. It would, therefore, be helpful to place stringent time limits on any
settlement process adopted by the organization-thereby ensuring that
the organization answers all claims brought against it. The draft
82. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 6(1).
83. See MULLER, supra note 40, at 176.
84. See id. at 177.
85. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 30. This obligation is set out in the draft
Agreement which provides that:
The Court shall, without prejudice to the powers and responsibilities of the
Assembly under the Statute, make provisions for appropriate modes of
settlement of:
(a) Disputes arising out of contracts and other disputes of a private law
character to which the Court is a party;
(b) Disputes involving any person referred to in the [Draft] Agreement who
by reason of his or her official position or function in connection with the
Court, enjoys immunity, if such immunity has not been waived.
Agreement should be amended further to require the Court to implement
a procedure for expediting the settlement of small claims.
E. Fiscal, Customs and Financial Exemptions
Before turning to the fiscal, customs and financial immunities of the
ICC, a common misconception held by governments, tax authorities and
the general public, who often argue in favor of a restrictive application
or even an abolition of exemptions, needs to be addressed concerning the
rationale behind them. 86 These privileges are not accorded merely to
deprive a government of possible sources of revenue and to prevent a
state's sovereign right to tax and levy customs; rather, they are necessary
to ensure the inherent independence of the organization. Complicated
duties and taxes with the attached supervisory mechanisms may severely
infringe upon the organization's independence.87 Fiscal privileges are
also accorded to preserve the sovereign equality of the member states.
That is to say, in this sense, funds that will be given to the Court by a
State Party should not be diverted into the treasuries of another by means
of national taxes and duties levied on the organization.88
In general, international organizations are accorded three types of
fiscal exemptions. 89 The ICC is no exception. The Court will first be
exempt from "all direct taxes" with the exception of those amounts that
are "no more than charges for public utility services." 90  The
organization will also be immune from all customs duties, as well as
import and export restrictions "in respect of articles imported or
exported by the Court for its official use and in respect of its
publications." 9' The rationale behind this exemption is to ensure that the
organization can secure its supplies wherever the most favorable terms
can be obtained. Moreover, it enables the institution to transfer goods,
86. MULLER, supra note 40, at 233.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 233-34.
89. For a general overview of the fiscal and customs privileges of international
organizations, see KuuIT AHLUWALIA, THE LEGAL STATUS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
OF THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND CERTAIN OTHER
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 115-22 & 127-34 (1964); S. Muller, International
Organizations and their Officials: to Tax or not to Tax?, 6 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 47 (1993).
90. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 8(1). "[D]irect taxes.., include, inter
alia, income tax, capital tax, corporation tax as well as direct taxes levied by local and
provincial authorities." Id. The equivalent privilege accorded to the ad hoc Tribunals is
found in General Convention, supra note 12, art. II, § 7(a); ICTY Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 19, art. X(1); ICTR Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art.
X(l).
91. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 8(2). The equivalent privilege accorded
to the ad hoc Tribunals is found in General Convention, supra note 12, art. II, § 7(b)-(c);
ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. X(2)(c); ICTR Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 26, art. X(3).
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equipment and capital from one country to another without becoming
liable to customs duties or being impeded by prohibitions and
restrictions on imports and exports.92
The third exemption concerns the ICC's ability to claim reimbursement of
taxes paid in connection to goods or services supplied on a recurring
basis or involving considerable expenditure,93 as well as excise duty
included in the price of alcoholic beverages, tobacco products and
hydrocarbons necessary for its official activities.94 The enjoyment of
this privilege is not unlimited, however, since the draft Agreement
states, "[for] major purchases of property and goods or services on
which identifiable duties and[/or] taxes are charged or are chargeable,
States Parties shall make appropriate administrative arrangements for the
exemption of such charges or reimbursement of the amount of duty
and/or tax paid." 9 Regardless, this privilege, along with the other fiscal
exemptions, will ensure that the Court has a high degree of financial
independence from the States Parties and should guarantee that the host
country, in particular, is prevented from enriching itself at the expense of
the international community.
Given the nature of its work, it is essential to the functioning of the
ICC, especially in times of emergency, that it have unrestricted freedom,
reliability and speed of communication. The provisions relating to the
freedom of communication-which are designed to safeguard
information to and from the organization-are set out in Article 11 of
the draft Agreement. Like the concept of inviolability, the freedom of
communication consists of two parts. First, it includes an active duty on
the part of the host country to supply the necessary assistance to ensure
that the Court may operate radio and other telecommunications
92. See Gerster, supra note 12, at 1141 (asserting that any bureaucratic
impediments in connection with customs clearance are also prohibited under the General
Convention, in Article II, Section 3).
93. See Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 9. See also Gerster, supra note 12, at
1141 (noting that this phrase has been interpreted quite generously by member States).
94. See Gerster, supra note 12, at 1141-42 (observing that although certain host
countries have contested the official character of consumer items, "such as foodstuffs,
spirits and tobacco products... [customs exemptions are generally granted] whenever
any representative duty or other official purpose of consumption by the United Nations
office in. question has been demonstrated. In any case of doubt, the 'official use' of
imported goods has to be ascertained by an evaluation of the facts rather than by juridical
interpretation."). Id.
95. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 9(1).
equipment and to provide the necessary protection thereof.96 The second
duty for the host country is to abstain from interfering with the
organization's communications. Such interference may be in the form
of censorship or the imposition of high taxes, duties and seemingly
97innocuous government licensing requirements.
With respect to its official communications, the ICC also enjoys
"treatment not less favorable than that accorded by the [State Parties] to
any intergovernmental organization or diplomatic mission in the matter
of priorities, rates and taxes applicable to mail and the various forms of
communication and correspondence, 98 and-with respect to the host
country-"shall be exempt from the licensing restrictions and permit
regime and any fees associated thereto." 99 Furthermore, the organization
is entitled to use codes and ciphers'00 and "to dispatch and receive
correspondence and other materials or communications either by courier
or in sealed bags, which... have the same privileges and immunities...
as diplomatic couriers and bags."' 0 '
Another principal aim of the ICC is to establish and maintain
international peace and security. To facilitate the achievement of this
aim, it seems likely that the Court will create a dedicated program to
disseminate and promote its work and objectives within those regions
where crimes were perpetrated. In this regard, during the last two years,
both the ICTY and the ICTR have established information outreach
programs, which have been received with praise and support by the
peoples of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively. 10 2  To
ensure the success of a similar program for the Court, it is imperative
that the States Parties recognize the Court's right to publish and
broadcast freely within their territories. Furthermore, all official
communications related to this program-whether in the form of
publications, still and moving pictures, videos, film, sound recordings or
96. See Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 11(5).
97. Id. art. 11(2).
98. Id. art. 11().
99. Basic Principles, supra note 35, 14.
100. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 11(3).
101. Id. art. 11(4).
102. For a discussion of how the establishment of an outreach programme for the
ICTY has facilitated the realization of some of the objectives of the ICTY, see Lal C.
Vohrah & Jon Cina, The Outreach Programme, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE: IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 547-57 (Richard May et al. eds.,
2000). See also Address ICTR Registrar, supra note 33 (observing that information
outreach programmes are important, "not merely to sensiti[z]e potential witnesses of the
functioning of the [ad hoc] Tribunals, but also to bring the proceedings closer to the
people, to inform them of what directly concerns them in an attempt to bridge the huge
gap between the remoteness of the Tribunals from the turbulent post-conflict regions
over which they ha[ve] jurisdiction."). Id.
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software-must be considered inviolable.
In view of the fact that its activities and communications will be
necessary in a myriad of locations, the right to hold, transfer and dispose
of funds will be essential to the proper functioning of the ICC. In this
context, Article 10, paragraph 1, of the draft Agreement provides:
Without being restricted by financial controls, regulations or financial moratoria
of any kind, while carrying out its activities:
a) The Court may hold funds, currency of any kind or gold and operate
accounts in any currency;
b) The Court shall be free to transfer its funds, gold or its currency from one
country to another or within any country and to convert any currency held
by it into any other currency;
c) The Court may receive, hold, negotiate, transfer, convert or otherwise deal
with bonds and other financial securities;
d) The Court shall enjoy the same facilities, if any, in respect of rates of
exchange for its financial transactions as are accorded to the most
favorably treated mission in that particular State Party. 103
These privileges originate from the bygone days where governments
maintained strict control over the flow of capital. Despite the
liberalization of international trade, the inclusion of this privilege is still
important given that, in times of economic reform or restructuring, a
State Party may enact strict currency restrictions which may severely
hinder the ability of the Court-which by its very nature operates across
international borders-to carry out foreign exchange transactions. It
should be noted, however, that the free movement of capital from one
country to another is not absolute but limited to the funds, gold or
currency of the Court. This could have a noticeable impact, for instance,
on the ability of the organization to move confiscated assets of suspects
and accused which find themselves in the de facto control of the Court.
IV. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES GRANTED To PERSONS
WHO HAVE To ATEND THE ORGANIZATION IN
AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY
On account of the unique circumstances within which the judges, the
Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors, the Registrar and the officials of the
ICC will have to work, the discussions within the Preparatory
Committee on the privileges and immunities of these persons proved to
be more laborious than the determination of the privileges and
103. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 10, 1.
immunities of the Court as a legal entity.104 Accordingly, to understand
fully the scope and substance of the various provisions of the draft
Agreement that relate to those categories of persons who have to attend
the organization in an official capacity, comparison should be made to
the privileges and immunities of their counterparts within the ad hoc
Tribunals.
A. Privileges and Immunities of the Judges, the Prosecutor,
the Deputy Prosecutors and the Registrar
Under the Rome Statute, "the [J]udges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy
Prosecutors 10 5 and the Registrar shall, when engaged on or with respect
to the business of the Court, enjoy the same privileges and immunities as
are accorded to heads of diplomatic missions." 106 This formulation
differs from the approach taken in the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals in
two important respects. First, the senior officials of the ad hoc Tribunals
are provided the same privileges and immunities as diplomatic envoys, a
status that United Nations Assistant Secretary-Generals and above enjoy
under the General Convention. 107 Nonetheless, this difference should
not place ICC senior officials in a less favorable position since head of
mission status is essentially the same as that of a diplomatic agent, with
similar privileges and immunities. °8  In accordance with customary
international law, ICC senior officials and their families shall therefore
enjoy, inter alia, personal inviolability-including immunity from arrest
or detention '-and immunity from criminal, civil, and administrative
104. See Maria Fariello Laux, Background Paper for the Consultation with
Representatives of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court (July 3,
2001), available at http://www.iccnow.org/html/FarielloLaux200I0703.pdf.
105. Under the headquarters agreements of the ad hoc Tribunals, the Deputy
Prosecutors of the ICTY and ICTR do not fall within the category of high officials, and
accordingly they are not entitled to full diplomatic privileges and immunities. This has
proved unfortunate, especially since the ad hoc Tribunals share the same Prosecutor,
who is therefore is required to divide her time between Arusha and The Hague. On those
occasions when she is away from The Hague, although the ICTY Deputy Prosecutor is
required to perform her functions, he is not entitled to the benefit of additional privileges
and immunities. To overcome this lacuna, during the summer of 2000 the Dutch
government agreed that the functional privileges and immunities enjoyed by the
Prosecutor were to be accorded to her deputy on those occasions when she was absent
from duty. See Note, Verbale from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of
The Netherlands to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (July
4, 2000) (on file with author).
106. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 48(2).
107. General Convention, supra note 12, art. V, § 19.
108. David Tolbert, Article 48: Privileges and Immunities, in COMMENTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 668 (0. Trifferner ed., 1999).
109. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18. 1961, art. 29,
500 U.N.T.S. 95, 23 U.S.T. 3227 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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jurisdiction. "° Moreover, their papers and documents are considered
inviolable,"' their personal baggage is generally exempt from
inspection 12 and they are exempt from taxation.1 3 These privileges and
immunities apply whether the ICC senior officials are acting within their
official duties or in a purely private capacity."
4
The second difference relates to the fact that the scope of the
privileges and immunities of ICC senior officials is limited by the
inclusion of language that merges the diplomatic immunity of a head of
mission or diplomatic agent with the concept of functional immunity.
By linking their privileges and immunities to the "business of the
Court,"'"' 5 the drafters of the Rome Statute have followed the approach
taken in the ICJ Statute, which provides "[t]he members of the Court,
when engaged on the business of the Court, shall enjoy diplomatic
privileges and immunities." ' 16 It is important, nonetheless, to realize
that the ICJ is not a criminal court and operates exclusively within in its
host country. Moreover, the government of The Netherlands has
essentially granted head of mission status to the members of the ICJ."
On the other hand, the ICC is a criminal court with a Prosecutor who
must operate not only in The Hague but also in many other jurisdictions.
As Tolbert remarks:
It is unclear whether this formulation would strip away some significant
immunities of a head of mission, whose immunities do not depend on acting on
official business. Indeed, it is difficult to reconcile the grant of head of mission
status, which implies a personal immunity in areas such as civil and criminal
jurisdiction, with the language linking that status to the "business of the Court".
These provisions, if not mutually exclusive, rest very uneasily together.
Functional immunity is a distinctly different concept from full diplomatic
immunity, and [Article 48] paragraph 2 [of the Rome Statute] appears to
confuse the two concepts.''8
The draft Agreement partly addresses these concerns by specifying that
if ICC senior officials are required to reside-for the purpose of holding
110. Id. art. 31.
111. Id. art. 30(2).
112. See, e.g., ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XIV(1)(f); ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. XIV(I)(f).
113. Vienna Convention, supra note 109, art. 34.
114. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 2, at 317.
115. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 48(2).
116. Statute of the International Court of Criminal Justice, art. 19 (on file with
author).
117. Tolbert, supra note 108, at 669.
118. Id.
themselves at the disposal of the Court-in a State Party of which they
are not nationals or permanent residents, they shall be accorded
diplomatic privileges during the period of their residence. 
19
In addition to the privileges and immunities they enjoy during their
term of office, the ICC judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors,
and the Registrar will also need continued protection for the duties they
performed during the course of their appointment. Since they will no
longer be officials of the Court, they do not need full immunity.
However, the ICC senior officials must be protected from judicial
proceedings concerning the decisions they took while they were in office
or the information they came across while performing their functions. 1
20
The Rome Statute, therefore, provides that after their departure from the
organization these officials shall "continue to be accorded immunity
from legal process of every kind in respect of words spoken or written
and acts performed by them in their official capacity."' 2
As with other international organizations, a fundamental principle of
the privileges and immunities of ICC senior officials is that they are not
for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves and that immunity
of any official should be waived when it would impede the course of
justice. The majority of the judges have the right and the duty to waive
the immunity of a judge or the Prosecutor in any case where, in their
opinion, the immunity can be waived without prejudice to the interests
for which it was accorded. The Presidency may waive the immunity
of the Registrar, 23 and the Prosecutor may waive that of the Deputy
Prosecutors. 124 It has been noted, however, that:
In essence, these arrangements provide for the supervisory powers to waive the
immunities of their subordinates, except in the case of a judge, who quite
reasonably will be subject to the decision of his or her fellow judges. However,
in the case of the Prosecutor, the power to waive is placed with the judges as
well. This may be criticized as it could be seen as an encroachment upon the
independence of the Prosecutor. It could thus be argued that the Assembly of
States Parties would be the appropriate authority to waive the Prosecutor's
immunity.1
25
119. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 15(3).
120. See Tolbert, supra note 108, at 670.
121. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 48(2).
122. See id. art. 48(5)(a).
123. Id. art. 48(5)(b).
124. Id. art. 48(5)(c). Under this provision, the Prosecutor also has the authority to
waive the immunity of the staff of the Office of the Prosecutor, while the ensuing
paragraph authorizes the Registrar to waive the immunity of the Deputy Registrar and
the staff of the Registry.
125. Tolbert, supra note 108, at 671.
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Such an approach would be roughly analogous to that taken vis-a-vis the
Secretary-General under the General Convention. 126
B. Privileges and Immunities of the Officials of the ICC
The officials of the ICC-namely the Deputy Registrar and the staff of
the offices of the Prosecutor and the Registry-shall enjoy the privileges
and immunities necessary for the independent performance of their
functions, in any country where they may be on business or may pass
through. Like those accorded to the Court itself, these privileges and
immunities are functional in nature rather than diplomatic. As provided
in the Rome Statute, the officials of the organization enjoy, in the
territory of the States Parties, such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection
with the institution. 127  They do not have immunities outside the
performance of their official duties.
To fully appreciate the privileges and immunities of ICC officials, we
need, once again, turn to the privileges and immunities of their
counterparts within the ad hoc Tribunals, which are also functional in
nature. The privileges and immunities of the officials of the ad hoc
Tribunals derive from Article V, Section 18 of the General Convention,
and are replicated in full in Article XV of their respective headquarters
agreements. In light of its applicability to the present discussion, before
commencing this analysis, it is necessary to emphasis three points that
underlie the General Convention. First and foremost, privileges and
immunities are granted to UN staff members in the interest of the United
Nations and not for the personal benefit or advantage of the individuals
themselves. 128 Second, while locally recruited personnel are considered
to be staff within the meaning of Article 101, paragraph 1 of the UN
Charter, they do not enjoy the same extent of privileges and immunities
as do expatriate staff, recruited abroad. Third, in accordance with
General Assembly resolution 76(I) of 7 December1946, the privileges
and immunities set out under the General Convention apply to all UN
officials except those who are both locally recruited and assigned to
hourly rates (even though the terms and conditions of their employment
are governed by the relevant United Nations resolutions, decisions,
126. See General Convention, supra note 12, art. V, § 20.
127. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 48(1).
128. General Convention, supra note 12, art. V, § 20.
regulations, rules and policies). 1
29
The most important element accorded to the officials of the ad hoc
Tribunals is the immunity from legal process in respect to words spoken
or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity.'
30
The primary rationale behind this provision is that when acting in their
official capacity, the acts of an official are, in effect, the acts of the
organization itself. Without such protection, officials of the ad hoc
Tribunals would be exposed to civil or criminal liability for acts done in
their official capacity; they could be summoned to appear as witnesses in
judicial proceedings to give evidence on official matters and could be
arrested and questioned by State authorities on issues arising out of their
official functions.
The subjection of the officials of the ad hoc Tribunals to legal process
would also leave them vulnerable to external pressures and influences, a
result which is directly contrary to Article 100 of the UN Charter, which
emphasizes the need to maintain the independence of UN officials. It
could further lead to the disclosure of confidential information and may
circumvent the inviolability of the documents and archives of the two
organizations. The notion of legal process is thus given a broad
interpretation and is considered to comprise of
the entire judicial proceedings, including the writ, mandate, summons or act by
which the court assumes jurisdiction and compels the appearance of the
defendant and witnesses and acts of execution, as well as other acts on the part
of public authorities, such as arrest and detention in custody, in conne[ct]ion to
the proceedings. '
3'
One must remember, however, that immunity from legal process for
official acts cannot be used as a protection behind which ICTY or ICTR
officials may hide while engaging in criminal activities or other conduct
directed against the host governments. The Secretary-General must
waive the immunity of such officials, where it can be waived without
prejudice to the interests of the organization.
132
Tarassenko and Zacklin observe that, although threats to the physical
safety and well being of UN officials are the most manifest intrusions
129. See Gerster, supra note 12, at 1142 (stating that the term 'official' refers to any
UN staff member who is "engaged on a full-time or substantially full-time basis and has
been notified in this capacity to the host country."). id.
130. See General Convention, supra note 12, art. V, § 18(a); ICTY Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 19, art. XV(1)(a); ICTR Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26,
art. XV(I)(a).
131. II YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 266
(1967).
132. General Convention, supra note 12, art. V, § 20; ICTY Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 19, art. XV(5); ICTR Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26,
art. XV(4).
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upon the independence of the organization, there are others which,
although less serious in nature, are nonetheless harmful to the United
Nations.133 This observation is also applicable in the case of the ad hoc
Tribunals. In order to protect and ensure the independent exercise of
their duties, officials of the two organizations are accorded exemption
from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to them by the
organization concerned.1 34 The rationale for this exemption is two-fold.
First, given the desirability to achieve equality of treatment for officials
of equal rank, it enables the two organizations to assign comparable
salary levels for equivalent posts without the need for continuous
adjustment that would be necessary if changes and variations in
domestic tax legislation had to be taken into account. Second, and most
importantly, the exemption ensures that funds contributed by member
states to the budget of the two organizations are not diverted to the
treasuries of a particular member state by means of national taxation of
the salaries of ICTY and ICTR officials. 13 The author notes, however,
that-with respect to former officials of the ad hoc Tribunals and their
dependants who choose to reside in The Netherlands or Tanzania
following their retirement from the organization-the exemption from
income tax in the host counties does not apply to any pension and
annuity paid by the organization to the individuals concerned.
136
Since the efficient conduct of the operations of the ad hoc Tribunals
would be jeopardized by their withdrawal from service for the purpose
of serving a period of national military service, the officials of the two
organizations are furthermore accorded immunity from national service
obligations. 137  This immunity also reflects an assumption, which
member states are required to share, that service in the United Nations is
as constructive a role for the individual to play in the preservation of
133. Tarassenko & Zacklin, supra note 5, at III.1/10.
134. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XV(1)(b); ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. XV(1)(b). See also General Convention,
supra note 12, art. V, § 18(b).
135. Tarassenko & Zacklin, supra note 5, at Ill.1/10-1/11.
136. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XIV(4). An explicit
exception to the tax exemption for pensions or annuities is not found in the ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, but may be implied by the limitation of the tax exemption to
"salaries and emoluments paid them by the Tribunal." ICTR Headquarters Agreement,
supra note 26, art. XV(I)(b).
137. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XV(1)(c); ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. XV(1)(c). See also General Convention,
supra note 12, art. V, § 18(c).
international peace and security, as would be service in national armed
forces.
To further ensure the independent fulfillment of their duties and
functions, ICTY and ICTR officials enjoy immunity from immigration
restrictions and alien registration. 38 This privilege does not derogate the
visa regime of the host countries concerned. However, entry controls
and any travel regulations may not impair freedom of movement in
substance. 39 The officials of the ad hoc Tribunals also "have the right
to import free of duties and taxes their furniture and effects at the time of
first taking up their post in the host country in question."'' 40  In this
regard, "internationally-recruited staff members [are] also... entitled to
export with relief from duties and taxes, on the termination of their
function in the host country, their furniture and personal effects,
including motor vehicles. '
41
Pursuant to Article XXI of the two headquarters agreements, the
officials of the ad hoc Tribunals have the additional right of unimpeded
entry into, exit from, and movement within the host country as
appropriate for the purposes of the organization. They are to be granted
facilities for speedy travel, and, moreover, any visas, entry permits or
licenses they may require are to be provided free of charge and as
promptly as possible. In this connection, the Dutch and Tanzanian
authorities are under an obligation to recognize and accept UN laissez-
passer as a valid travel document,142 and once in the host country, the
officials of the two institutions are, upon request of the organizations, to
be issued an identification card certifying their status. 1
43
138. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XV(I)(d); ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. XV(I)(d). See also General Convention,
supra note 12, art.V, § 18(d).
139. Gerster, supra note 12, at 1145.
140. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XV(I)(g); ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. XV(I)(g). See also General Convention,
supra note 12, art. V, § 18(g).
141. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art.XV(3); ICTR Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 26, art. XV(3)(c).
142. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XXIV(I); ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. XXIV(1). See also General Convention,
supra note 12, art. VII, § 24.
143. See ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XXV; ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. XXV. The usefulness of such an
identification card is demonstrated by the fact that-since it contains information on the
nationality and residence status of the holder-an identity card issued to an ICTY
official may be used whenever proof of identity is requested-for example by a notary
public, bank, employment office, or immigration officials-and serves as identification
in the event of the bearer being stopped by the police or border control authorities.
Although holders of these cards are allowed to travel without a visa within the Schengen
territories (the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, France, Italy, Spain,
Austria, Greece and Portugal), the card itself is not a valid travel document. Both
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Since access to the region is an indispensable aspect to the
prosecution's work, a similar provision on freedom of movement is
contained in the agreements that have been concluded relating to the
establishment of the three ICTY liaison offices operating in the former
Yugoslavia, as well as the agreement on the Kigali investigative and
prosecutorial office.' 44 Although this provision has generally met with
compliance, in 1998 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia denied a
request for the issuance of visas to ICTY investigators who wished to
enter Kosovo to conduct on-site investigations of the alleged atrocities
that were occurring in the area. The disregard shown by the Yugoslav
authorities to their international obligations was further demonstrated
when border guards refused entry to the Prosecutor herself when she
attempted to gain access to Kosovo on January 18, 1999, in order to
investigate the massacre of approximately forty-five Kosovo-Albanians
in and around the town of Racak.145
A principle associated with the freedom of movement is the obligation
of the competent authorities of a host country to take all effective and
adequate measures to ensure the appropriate security, safety and
protection of the premises of an international organization and its
officials. For instance, Article XXVI of the two headquarters agreement
provides that "[t]he competent authorities shall take effective and
adequate action which may be required to ensure the appropriate
security, safety and protection of persons referred to in this Agreement,
indispensable for the proper functioning of the Tribunal, free from
interference of any kind. On account of the precarious situation in
which the officials of the ad hoc Tribunals are placed while in the field,
it is surprising that a similar requirement was not expressly included
within the agreements relating to the establishment of the three ICTY
liaison offices, as well as the Kigali investigative and prosecutorial
passport and identity card must be shown when travelling outside the Netherlands. See
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, PROTOCOL GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
13-16 (2000) (on file with author).
144. See Sarajevo Office Agreement, supra note 21; Belgrade Office Agreement,
supra note 22; Zagreb Office Agreement, supra note 23; Kigali Office Agreement, supra
note 28.
145. Jane Perlez, Defiant Yugoslav Orders Expulsion of U.S. Diplomat, NEW YORK
TIMES, January 19, 2001, at Al; Tom Walker, Serbs take village massacre bodies, THE
TIMES OF LONDON, January 19, 1999, at 11.
146. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XXVI; ICTR Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 26, art. XXVI.
office. 1
47
In light of the privileged status they enjoy in their host countries, the
officials of the ICTY and ICTR are also granted the same privileges in
respect to exchange facilities as are accorded to members of comparable
rank of diplomatic missions established in the host country.
148
Furthermore, they are given, together with their spouses and dependent
family members, the same repatriation facilities in time of international
crisis as diplomatic agents. 149
With respect to fiscal privileges, it should be noted that under the
Vienna Convention diplomatic representatives of independent States are
accorded exemption from the payment of all dues and taxes (personal or
real, national, regional or municipal) with the exception of charges
levied for specific services rendered,'15 indirect taxes incorporated in the
price of goods and services, and taxes levied on property or personal
activities unrelated to their diplomatic functions.' Because they are
considered to hold the same status as diplomatic agents, officials of the
grade P-5 and above (in the case of the ICTY) and P-4 and above (in the
case of the ICTR) are granted a number of 'additional' privileges and
immunities by the host country. 152 However, the enjoyment of these
privileges and immunities is not accorded to persons having Netherlands
147. See Sarajevo Office Agreement, supra note 21; Belgrade Office Agreement,
supra note 22; Zagreb Office Agreement, supra note 23; Kigali Office Agreement, supra
note 28.
148. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XV(I)(e);ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. XV(1)(e). See also General Convention,
supra note 12, art. V, § 18(e).
149. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XV(I)(f); ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. XV(l)(f). See also General Convention,
supra note 12, art. V, § 18(0.
150. Vienna Convention, supra note 109, art. 34; see also EILEEN DENZA,
DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS 296 (2d ed., 1998) (noting that such charges include road or bridge tolls,
charges or rates levied in respect of such matters as water supply, road improvements
and street lighting).
151. Vienna Convention, supra note 109, art. 34.
152. See ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XV(2); ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. XV(2). For example, ICTY officials
having the rank P-5 and above are currently accorded the following 'additional'
privileges and immunities:
(a) Motor vehicle tax (motorrijtuigenbelasting);
(b) tax on passenger motor vehicles and motorcycles (bekasting van
personenauto's en motorrijwielen);
(c) value added tax (omzetbelasting) paid on goods and services supplied
involving considerable expenditure or supplied on a recurring basis;
(d) excise duty (accijnzen) included in the price of alcoholic beverages,
tobacco products and hydrocarbons, such as fuel oils and motor fuels; and
municipality taxes.
Id.
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or Tanzanian nationality, or have established permanent residence in the
host country.
153
In accordance with Article XXVII of the two headquarters
agreements, officials of the ad hoc Tribunals-as they are subject to the
United Nations Staff Regulations and Rules and, if they have an
appointment of six months' duration or more-are exempt from all
compulsory contributions to the social security system of the host
country, and are therefore not covered against the risks described in the
social security regulations. 154 This exemption is also applicable to the
spouse and dependent family members of the officials of the two
organizations, so long as they are not employed or self-employed in the
host country or receive a Dutch or Tanzanian social security benefit as
appropriate. 155 In this connection, the United Nations and the Dutch
Government entered into an agreement in July 2001, allowing the spouse
and dependent family members of ICTY officials to seek gainful
employment in the Netherlands; a right that was restricted previously to
nationals of the European Union and the European Economic Area.1
56
As noted above, individuals who are locally recruited and assigned
hourly rates (such as cleaners and gardeners) do not enjoy the privileges
and immunities set out under Section 18 of the General Convention.
However, the inviolability of the ICTY and ICTR would be undermined
if such persons could be summoned to testify about matters that have
been brought to their attention as a result of their association with the
organization. Consequently, they are accorded immunity from legal
process in respect of words spoken or written and acts performed by
them in their official capacity for the organization in question; with such
immunity continuing after the termination of their employment. 1
57
Turning back to the ICC, the functional privileges and immunities
accorded to officials working for the organization are similar to those
enjoyed by their counterparts within the ad hoc Tribunals, with a couple
153. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XV(2); ICTR Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 26, art. XV(2).
154. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XXVII(1); ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. XXVII(1).
155. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XXVII(2); ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. XXVII(2).
156. See Exchange of Notes between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Government of The Netherlands and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (July 20, 2001) (copy on file with the author).
157. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XVI; ICTR Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 26, art. XV(1).
of notable additions. In order to reflect current thinking in this area, ICC
officials are also accorded "immunity from personal arrest or detention
and from seizure of their personal baggage." 158 The inclusion of these
immunities should, in particular, facilitate the ability of prosecution staff
to conduct on-site investigations independently and in an efficient
manner and will thereby overcome a number of problems facing the
officials of the ad hoc Tribunals.
159
However, on account of the recent proliferation of international
organizations and the resulting demand for highly qualified international
civil servants, this author believes that the ICC must be placed in a
position to present an attractive and competitive employment package to
its staff. To address this need, the Preparatory Committee has proposed
that the ICC Headquarters Agreement includes a provision establishing a
most favored international organization status upon the Court, thereby
ensuring that the privileges and immunities enjoyed by ICC officials,
especially tax concessions, are no less favorable than those accorded to
persons working at other international organizations located in the host
country. 16  Moreover, to ensure prospective staff members do not
decline an offer of appointment on account of the lack of employment
opportunities for their spouses or family members, the host country has
been requested to permit such persons to seek gainful employment in the
Netherlands during the period of the appointment of the ICC officials.161
Although exemption from all compulsory contributions to the social
security organizations of the Kingdom of The Netherlands is included
within the draft principles,' 62 it would be advantageous-especially for
the purposes of attracting highly qualified locally recruited staff,
particularly in the extremely competitive field of information technology
-if payments from the pension scheme operated by the organization
were exempted from the payment of income tax. 163
158. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 16(1)(a).
159. Zelniker, supra note 32, at 1011 (commenting that the provisions of the Rome
Statute dealing with on-site investigations appear to grant the Prosecutor and his/her staff
no more privileges than a tourist).
160. Basic Principles, supra note 35, [ 1(h). Although not found in the ICTY
Headquarters Agreement, the government of the Netherlands has accorded such a status
to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. See Separate Agreement
with respect to the Agreement between the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning the Headquarters of the
OPCW, T 4., printed in OPCW: THE LEGAL TEXTS 332 (L. Woollomes Tabassi ed.,
1999).
161. Basic Principles, supra note 35, 20.
162. Id. [21.
163. A provision to this effect is contained in Article IX, Section 18 of the
Agreement between the United Nations and the Republic of Austria regarding the
Headquarters of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, April 13,
1967, 8679 U.N.T.S. 93.
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C. Privileges and Immunities of Other Persons Attending the
Court in an Official Function
Two other categories of individuals who will attend the ICC in an
official function need to be mentioned, namely 'experts on mission,' and
representatives of States Parties participating in meetings of the
Assembly. With regard to the first category, it should be noted that
following their establishment, it soon become clear that the ad hoc
Tribunals would require the services of a number of highly-qualified
experts on a short term basis to carry out specific missions for the two
organizations, or on their behalf, and at their expense (particularly, in
respect to the exhumation projects which were being operated by the
Prosecutor). In accordance with Article VI of the General Convention,
'experts on mission' were granted, during the period of their missions
including the time spent in journeys, a number of privileges and
immunities necessary for them to carry out their functions in an
expedient and independent manner.' 64 However, unlike the officials of
the two institutions, 'experts on mission', among their privileges and
immunities, enjoy an express immunitr from personal arrest or detention
and from seizure of personal baggage.
The inclusion of an article relating to the privileges and immunities of
'experts on mission' was surprisingly absent from the original version of
the draft Agreement, even though it was obvious-at least to this author
164. See General Convention, supra note 12, art. VI, § 22; ICTY Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 19, art. XVII; ICTR Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art.
XVII. Under its advisory opinion of December 15, 1989, the ICJ stated that "the purpose
of [Article V,] Section 22 [of the General Convention] is ... to enable the United
Nations to entrust missions to persons who do not have the status of an official of the
Organization and to guarantee them 'such privileges and immunities as are necessary for
the independent exercise of their functions'.... The essence of the matter lies not in their
administrative position but in the nature of their mission." Applicability of Article VI,
Section 22 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,
(Advisory Opinion), 1989 ICJ 194. This opinion, issued at the request of the Economic
and Social Council, concerned Mr. Dumitru Mazilu, a Romanian national, who was
nominated to serve as a member of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities (a subsidiary organ of the Human Rights
Commission, which was in turn a subsidiary organ of the Economic and Social Council).
For political reasons, the Rumanian Government prevented Mr. Mazilu from leaving
Romania in order to reach the United Nations headquarters, receiving documents from
the organization, and preparing a report assigned to him by the Secretary-General.
165. Experts on mission are not exempt from national taxation, since they do not
receive regular UN salaries but special allowances and honoraria, or are even on the
payroll of their native countries. Gerster, supra note 12, at 1144-45.
-that a number of persons, other than ICC officials, would be required
to carry out specific and highly specialized functions for the Court,
especially during its start-up operations. The absence of such an article
was fortunately noted by a number of delegates attending the ICC
Preparatory Committee, leading to a discussion paper being submitted at
its eighth session, 166 proposing that this category of persons be explicitly
included in the draft Agreement. 167  The delegates agreed and a
provision according 'experts on mission' the privileges and immunities
necessary for the independent exercise of their functions was inserted
into the draft Agreement. 168 The author notes, however, that despite the
fact that it has become a codified norm of international law that the
privileges and immunities accorded to 'experts on mission' are quasi-
diplomatic in nature, 169 this provision accords them no higher status than
that enjoyed by ICC officials.
Under the Rome Statute, an Assembly of States Parties-which is
open to States Parties as members and to other States as observers-is to
be established to provide, among other matters, managerial and
budgetary oversight of the operations of the Court.7 0 To ensure that
they may carry out their duties independently without interference by
either the host country or third parties, the draft Agreement provides that
the representatives of States participating in the meetings of the
Assembly and its subsidiary organs-as well as representatives of
observer States and intergovernmental organizations invited to attend
such meetings-enjoy partial diplomatic privileges and immunities. 1
Like the other categories of persons falling within the draft
Agreement, representatives of States Parties and other persons falling
within this category are accorded immunity from jurisdiction (legal
166. The eighth session of the Preparatory Committee was held in New York from
September 24 - October 5, 2001. See generally, Proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at
its eighth session, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2001/L.3/Rev.I (2001), available at
http://www.un.org/lawlicclprepcommlsep200l/englishlpcnicc_2001 13_revle.doc (last
visited May 1, 2002).
167. Draft agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Court: Discussion
Paper Proposed by the Coordinator on Articles 17 and 19 in PCNICC/2001/L. ]/Rev. 1I/
Add.3, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2001/WGAPIC/RT.2 (2001), available at http://www.un.
org/law/icc/prepcommlsep200 I /english/wgapicrt2e.doc (last visited May 1, 2002).
168. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 21.
169. See, e.g., General Convention, supra note 12, art. VI, § 22.
170. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 112. See generally, S. Rama Rao, Article 112:
Assembly of State parties, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1201-13 (0. Trifferer ed., 1999).
171. Representatives of States participating in the proceedings of the Court shall
also enjoy-while exercising their official functions, and during their journey to and
from the place of the proceedings-the same privileges and immunities as are accorded
to representatives of States participating in the Assembly and its subsidiary organs. See
Draft Agreement supra note 33, art. 14.
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process), with respect to their official acts and words spoken or written
in an official capacity. 172 These persons are also granted immunity from
personal arrest or detention
17 3 and from seizure of personal baggage.
174
Moreover, all papers and documents belonging to them are inviolable. 175
For non-resident representatives of States Parties, the most important
privilege is the unrestricted entry to and departure from the locality of
the meetings of the Assembly and its subsidiary organs and the right to
protection by the host countries concerned. 176 In this way, it should be
noted that the nationality of the representatives of States Parties is at the
discretion of sending states, thus, a host country is only entitled to
restrict privileges and immunities for reasons of nationality, if a
representative is a national or permanent resident of the host country
concerned. 1
77
V. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF OTHER PERSONS REQUIRED
AT THE SEAT OF THE COURT
In addition to the senior officials of the ICC and its staff, various other
persons are required at the seat of the Court, either as defense counsel,
expert witnesses, witnesses of fact or in some other capacity. As these
categories of persons do not fall within the classical categories of
persons enjoying privileges and immunities, in order to ensure the
effective operations of the Court, the drafters of the draft Agreement
specifically included various provisions according a limited array of
privileges and immunities to defense counsel, victims and witnesses.
178
Similar provisions were included in the headquarters agreements of the
ad hoc Tribunals. 179
A. Privileges and Immunities of Defense Counsel
One of the main principles underlying the right to a fair trial, as set out
in Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals, is the right of suspects and accused
to an adequate and effective defense. In recognition of this principle,
172. Id. art. 13 (1)(b).
173. Id. art. 13 (1)(a).
174. Id. art. 13 (1)(g).
175. Id. art. 13 (1)(c).
176. Id. art. 13 (1)(e).
177. Gerster, supra note 12, at 1145.
178. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, arts. 18-21.
179. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, arts. XVIII-XIX; ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 269, arts. XVIII-XIX.
Article XIX of the two headquarters agreements provides that defense
counsel "shall not be subjected by the host country to any measure [that]
may affect the free and independent exercise of [their] functions under
the Statute. ' ' 8 Because their privileged status is functional, counsel are
only accorded exemption from immigration restrictions, inviolability of
documentation and immunity from legal process.' 18 Such immunities,
however, are without prejudice to the regime that the court has
established governing their conduct. 182 Furthermore, as they are not
intended for the personal benefit of the recipient but in the interests for
the good administration of justice, the UN Secretary-General may waive
the privileges and immunities of defense counsel. 18
In order to provide their clients an adequate defense, defense counsel
is required to undertake extensive travel to the region where the crimes
were allegedly committed, as well as to numerous other destinations,
particularly in view of the fact that potential witnesses are dispersed
across the globe. While their prosecutorial counterparts can rely on the
protection afforded by the General Convention, as well as the
agreements concluded with respect to the ICTY and ICTR liaison offices
when travelling in the field, the privileges and immunities accorded to
counsel are only applicable in the Netherlands and Tanzania. To address
the lack of equality in treatment, the Registrar of ICTR has nonetheless
agreed to issue a "Letter of Mission" to defense counsel that provides
mild assistance to them during their travels in relation to their case.' 
84
The provisions of the draft Agreement according privileges and
immunities to defense counsel appearing before the ICC are
considerably stronger than those found in the headquarters agreements
of the ad hoc Tribunals. To ensure that those appearing before the Court
are not given the slightest excuse to protest that they are denied a fair
trial, the drafters of the Rome Statute went to great lengths to ensure that
180. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XIX (1); ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. XIX (1).
181. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, Article XIX(2); ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. XIX(2). See also MORRIS & SCHARF, supra
note 2, at 316 (noting that "[t]he Nuremberg Charter did not provide for the privileges
and immunities of the Nuremberg Tribunal since it operated in territory occupied by the
Allied States. However, the United States authorities granted immunity to German
defense lawyers from national prosecution for membership in the Nazi Party or the S.S.,"
thereby enabling them to participate in the subsequent Nuremberg proceedings).
182. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XIX(3); ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. XIX(3).
183. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XIX(4); ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. XIX(4).
184. ICTR Discussion Paper on the Working Documents of the Preparatory
Commission of the International Criminal Court (November 24, December 8, 2000 &
February 24 - March 3, 2001) (on file with author).
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the rights of persons suspected, accused and convicted of the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community would be
respected. 185 Of particular importance to the present discussion was the
incorporation into the Statute of the right of equality of arms and the
right to legal assistance. 186 With respect to the latter, the corpus of
international human rights institutions is clear that courts have a special
responsibility to ensure that the legal representation provided to suspects
and accused, and in particular to those that are indigent, is adequate and
effective. 187  However, the integrity and success of the Court-an
institution whose primary purpose is to ensure that justice is done-will
be judged, not on the existence of these provisions, but in their
application.
Apart from being accorded the resources essential to conduct an
adequate and effective defense, defense counsel-as well as persons
assisting counsel, particularly investigators and researchers-are to be
accorded privileges and immunities "necessary for the proper
functioning of the Court."'88 As such, they need to be provided with
privileges and immunities that enable them to effectively and adequately
represent their clients in court, to communicate with their clients in
confidence and maintain the confidentiality of their files and channels of
communication, and to interview witnesses and conduct on-site
investigations wherever necessary and in a timely manner.189
Article 18 of the draft Agreement addresses these needs. In order to
protect their role in courtroom proceedings, defense counsel shall enjoy
immunity from legal proceedings, 90 as well as exemption from
185. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 67.
186. Id. art. 67(1)(d); see also Address ICTR Registrar, supra note 33 (stressing that
"[t]he equality of arms between the parties is sacrosanct.").
187. See Stuart Beresford & Hafida Lahiouel, The Right to be Defended in Person
or Through Legal Assistance and the International Criminal Court, 13 LEIDEN. J. INT'L
L. 949 (2000).
188. Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 48(4). For an overview of the privileges and
immunities accorded to counsel, see generally Kenneth S. Gallant, The Role and Powers
of Defense Counsel in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 34 INT'L L.
21(2000).
189. International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association, Proposal by the
International Criminal Defense Attorneys Association: Protection of the Rights of the
Defence in the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal
Court, with Special Attention to the Needs of the Defence Outside the Host Country,
(2001), at http://www.hfi.calpartners/aiad-icdaa/reports/protectionoftherights.html (last
visited May 1, 2002).
190. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 18(l)(b).
immigration restrictions or alien registration.191 Documents, papers and
materials relating to the exercise of their functions are also inviolable. 
192
To take account of rapid developments in information technology,
especially the storage of information in electronic format, it is submitted
that the latter privilege should be expanded to include data information.
The draft Agreement protects the confidentiality of communications
between defense counsel and their clients (or the court itself) by
ensuring that the former are entitled to receive and send papers or
correspondence, by courier or in sealed bags, and to receive and send
electronic communications. 193 When combined with the privilege of
document inviolability, these rights will also facilitate counsel-client
communications, especially when the two are located in different
countries, which may occur frequently during the investigative stage of
the proceedings.
It is in the area of on-site investigations that the privileges and
immunities accorded to defense counsel will be most beneficial.
Counsel "may need to travel not only in countries where they might not
be welcome, by association with their client, but [also] in the difficult
terrain of refugee camps [where many potential defense witnesses may
be located]." 1 9 It may also be the case that a limited number of lawyers
have refugee status themselves. While this should not diminish their
professionalism as a lawyer, when "combined with the stigma of
association with [a person] accused of the most heinous crimes
imaginable, the maintenance of equality with the [p]rosecution [will be]
an undeniable challenge."195 They are therefore provided with immunity
from arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal baggage,1
96
which shall also be exempt from inspection, unless there are serious
grounds for believing that the baggage contains articles not for personal
use, prohibited by law, or controlled by quarantine regulations.
97
Moreover, they shall be accorded fair treatment in respect of currency
and exchange, 98 as well as repatriation facilities in times of crisis.1
99
Although defense counsel may obtain an order of a pre-trial chamber
to facilitate the collection of evidence and the conduct of its on-site
investigations, 200 and the right to travel, especially in the field, is not
191. Id. art. 18(I)(e).
192. Id. art. 18(I)(c).
193. Id. art. 18(l)(d).
194. Address ICTR Registrar, supra note 33.
195. Id.
196. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 18(1)(a).
197. Id. art. 18(l)(f).
198. Id. art. 18(1)(g).
199. Id. art. 18(l)(h).
200. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 57(3)(b); Finalized Draft Text of the Rules
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unrestricted; the draft Agreement provides that applications for visas and
entry/exit permits shall be dealt with as speedily as possible and granted
free of charge. 20 1 Furthermore, despite the fact that they are not to be
issued a UN laissez-passer, they are to be provided with a certificate
under the signature of the Registrar for the period required for the
exercise of their functions.2 °2 It should be noted that certificates are
issued to consultants on mission for the United Nations, as it is the long-
standing policy of the organization not to issue laissez-passer to persons
who do not represent the institution and are not official staff members
thereof.20 3 The certificates in question resemble a laissez-passer-in that
they are in the form of a renewable passport-and are widely recognized
by custom officials. In the author's opinion, therefore, if the certificates
display, in their inside cover (as do laissez-passer), the extent of the
privileges and immunities granted, counsel should receive the necessary
functional access and should thereby be placed on an equal footing to
prosecution staff in this regard.
B. Privileges and Immunities of Victims and Witnesses
Under the headquarters agreements of the ad hoc Tribunals, witnesses
are accorded a limited array of privileges and immunities, relating
primarily to their freedom of movement. No special status is accorded to
victims unless they are required at the seat of the Tribunals for the
purpose of testifying. In addition to having the right of unimpeded entry
into, exit from and movement within the territory of the Netherlands and
Tanzania, witnesses are to be issued visas, entry permits or licenses,
where required, free of charge and as promptly as possible. 204 These
facilities are also to be accorded to persons accompanying witnesses to
The Hague and Arusha (such as dependants or support persons).2 5
Moreover, witnesses are not to be "prosecuted or detained or subjected
to any other restriction of their liberty by the authorities of the host
country in respect of acts or convictions prior to their entry into the
of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.I, art. 116, Rule 116,
available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/index.htm (last visited May 1, 2002).
201. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 29.
202. Id. art. 18(2).
203. General Convention, supra note 12, art. VII, § 26.
204. See ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XXIII; ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. XXIII.
205. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XXIII; ICTR Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 26, art. XXIII.
territory of the host country." 206 Such immunity shall cease fifteen days
after the date upon which the ICTY or ICTR, as the case may be, no
longer requires the presence of the witness.
207
In the case of the ICTY, it soon became apparent that in order to
corroborate their testimony, witnesses (particularly, those providing
expert evidence) appearing from outside the host country may be
required to bring a number of papers and documents to The Hague. As
it was imperative that such papers and documentation were not
intercepted or tampered with prior to being admitted as evidence, the
ICTY reached agreement with the Dutch authorities that while they are
in the territory of the host country, witnesses appearing before the court
would enjoy inviolability for all papers and documents in their
possession.
The freedom of movement of witnesses appearing before the ad hoc
Tribunals is not limited solely to the territories of the host countries. On
account of the general wording contained in Articles 29(4) and 30(4) of
the ICTR and ICTY Statutes, respectively-namely, that persons
required at the seat of the courts shall be accorded such treatment as is
necessary for the proper functioning of the organizations-witnesses
have the protection of these rights while traveling to and from, and in
some cases through, other member States.2°9 Nonetheless, it is arguable
whether they are immune from legal proceeding regarding their
testimony before the courts, or whether they benefit from other
privileges and immunities generally accorded to the officials of the ad
hoc Tribunals.
The draft Agreement is not as restrictive as the headquarters
agreements of the ad hoc Tribunals, either in scope or in substance. It
specifies that both witnesses and victims, participating in the
proceedings (as well as other persons required to be present at the seat of
the ICC), shall be accorded such treatment as is necessary for their
appearance before the Court, including the time spent on journeys in
connection with their appearance. 210 As they will have to travel to and
from, and in some cases through, other States, these categories of
persons will require not only the co-operation of officials in those States
but also safe conduct and, in principle, jurisdictional immunity during
206. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XVIII(I); see also ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra, note 26, art. XVIII(I).
207. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XVIII(2); ICTR
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 26, art. XVIII(2).
208. See letter from Rudolf Bekink, Chief of Protocol: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Government of The Netherlands, to Dorothee de Sampayo Garrido-Nijgh,
Registrar: ICTY (June 9, 2000) (on file with author).
209. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 2, at 319; Zelniker, supra note 32, at 1004.
210. Draft Agreement, supra note 33, arts. 19, 20 & 22.
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the course of their testimony before the Court.211 Accordingly, the
delegates of the Preparatory Commission have agreed that they should
be accorded the same privileges and immunities as those provided to
counsel with the exception of repatriation and currency exchange
212facilities.
zl
The draft Agreement appears, on its face, to have the necessary
elements and sufficient provisions for a successful witness operation. In
particular, by providing certain privileges and immunities to the
witnesses during their stay at, and travel to and from, the seat of the ICC,
it addresses some of the problems the ad hoc Tribunals have faced in
their witness operations. 13 Unfortunately, there seems to be an
inaccurate assumption as to the ability of victims and witnesses to
arrange for their travel documentation and visas relying solely on a
certificate issued by the organization. To avoid any abuse of these
certificates and, more importantly, in order to cater for the needs of
victims and witnesses-some of whom may be extremely reluctant to
approach the relevant national authorities in order to obtain a valid
passport to travel to The Hague-the Court should follow the practice of
the ad hoc Tribunals and arrange through the appropriate diplomatic
channels for the issuance of visas and travel documentation. In this
regard, it is inappropriate (and unnecessary) to require the organization
to advise all States Parties of the names of persons falling within this
category; a requirement which is currently set out in Article 20 of the
draft Agreement.
The granting of privileges and immunities to "other persons required
to be present at the seat of the Court" should ensure that persons
providing emotional and other forms of support to witnesses, particularly
the victims of violent crime-for instance, counselors who are not
officials of the institution-will have the necessary freedom to carry out
their functions. Although there is no specific function which they
perform for the Court, whether directly or indirectly, it would have been
useful if family members and other dependants of witnesses were also
included in this article so as to guard against attempts to harass witnesses
211. Tolbert, supra note 108, at 671.
212. Compare Draft Agreement, supra note 33, art. 19(1) with Draft Agreement,
supra note 33, art. 18(1).
213. See Address ICTR Registrar, supra note 33 (relating that "[t]he overwhelming
majority of witness called upon [by the ICTR] have never traveled abroad before, do not
have valid travel documents or are refugees."), Id.
by 'getting at' their family members. For example, a rouge State may
attempt to dissuade witnesses from testifying by persecuting their loved
ones on trumped up charges, such as 'conspiring' with the witness, to
pervert the course of justice.
C. Privileges and Immunities of the Accused
Commentators and academics alike have strongly argued that "it
would be repugnant to confer on indicted war criminals the privileges
and immunities of United Nations officials or diplomats by making the
[General Convention] applicable to this group. ,214 Nonetheless, in light
of the fact that the operations of the ad hoc Tribunals would be
undermined if the host country could exercise its jurisdiction over
suspects or accused who have been acquitted or otherwise released by
the court, Article XX of the two headquarters agreements states that
[t]he host country shall not exercise its criminal jurisdiction over persons
present in its territory, who are to be or have been transferred as a suspect or an
accused to the premises of the Tribunal pursuant to a request or an order of the
Tribunal, in respect of acts, omissions or convictions prior to their entry into the
territory of the host country.
215
Such immunity is limited to crimes committed prior to the arrival of the
suspects and accused in The Netherlands and Tanzania, as appropriate,
and is only applicable for a period of fifteen days following their
release.216
Suspects and accused are not accorded privileges and immunities
under either the Rome Statute or the draft Agreement. The author does
not have an elaborate insight into the political machinations that were
behind the exclusion of this category of persons from the draft
Agreement. Nonetheless, in light of the fact that in the ICC context,
provisional release will be the norm as opposed to the exception (as in
the case of the ad hoc Tribunals),1 7 the question of whether suspects and
accused require a limited array of privileges and immunities
(particularly, exemption from immigration restrictions) should have been
addressed. Granted, this is a very controversial issue and-if it turned
out that they were prevented from travelling to the seat of the Court-
such problems could be resolved pragmatically by simply bringing
214. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 2, at 319.
215. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XX(1); ICTR Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 26, art. XX(1).
216. ICTY Headquarters Agreement, supra note 19, art. XX(2); ICTR Headquarters
Agreement, supra note 26, art. XX(2).
217. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 60(2); see also P. Wald & J. Martinez,
Provisional Release at the ICTY." A Work in Progress, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE
AND EVIDENCE: IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 234-47 (R. May et al. eds.,
2000).
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suspects or accused within the scope of "other persons required to be
present at the seat of the Court." Nonetheless, given the consequential
effects of adopting this approach, the current omission of a separate
provision on suspects and accused is highly unfortunate.21 8
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
After overcoming many practical, financial and structural problems,
the existing international criminal tribunals have demonstrated that they
are no-longer "paper tigers": established as a token gesture to appease
those who criticized the major powers for refusing to intervene militarily
in the humanitarian crises that unfolded in many regions throughout the
world during the last decade. 2'9  The growing commitment of the
international community to create a fair and independent global system
of justice, empowered with the ability to bring to trial the perpetrators of
mass crimes in the hope of deterrence of further violence and in the hope
of peace, was further demonstrated by the establishment of the ICC.
Given the strenuous efforts of all those who participated in the historic
events in Rome, it would be inexcusable if the States Parties did not
provide the ICC with the necessary tools to carry out its functions
independently and in a fair and effective manner. To this end, the
delegates at the Preparatory Commission have prepared a document on
the legal status of the organization that is sufficient for the needs of an
international criminal court. Moreover, they have paid close attention to
the experiences of the ad hoc Tribunals and have ensured that the
judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors, the Registrar and the
officials of the Court will be accorded the privileges and immunities
necessary for the independent exercise of their functions. They have
also included within the draft Agreement, provisions that expand
substantially upon the protection offered to defense counsel as well as
witnesses and victims participating in the proceedings.
218. The drafters of the Basic Principles have attempted to address this concern by
recommending that a provision be included in the ICC Headquarters Agreement
specifying that the host country shall not exercise its criminal jurisdiction over accused
persons in respect of acts, omissions or convictions prior to their entry into the territory
of the host country. See Basic Principles, supra note 35, 25.
219. For instance, since their creation, the ad hoc Tribunals have issued collectively
68 public indictments against 167 individuals, of whom 112 have been taken into
custody. Sixteen trials have been completed, resulting in 24 convictions, and a further 8
individuals have pleaded guilty to the charges against them.
The independence, safety, well-being and protection of the officials of
the Court, as well as other persons involved in the proceedings will only
be achieved, however, if there is a strong and clear commitment by the
States Parties to scrupulously and unequivocally observe their legal
obligations. Although it is likely that the great majority of States Parties
will respect the principle of independence, as well as other privileges
and immunities, it is plausible that a limited number may restrict or even
disregard altogether the international status of these persons, particularly
in areas where on-site investigations are taking place and where the
Court employs large numbers of locally-recruited officials. The
Assembly of States Parties should therefore be sensitive to the claims of
encroachment on the safety and well being of ICC officials as well as
any actions that may undermine the independence of the ICC. State
Parties must be prepared to explore all available mechanisms to ensure
that the operations of the organization are not jeopardized.22 °
220. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 87(7) & I 12(2)(f) (concerning the role of
the Assembly of States Parties in cases where a State Party fails to comply with a request
to cooperate by the Court contrary to the provisions of the Rome Statute).
